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NOTES AND COMMENTS

PROPERTY: CoNDoMINIUM: WHAT PLACE

-SPACE?

Since early 1962 when Congress added Section 284 to the National Housing Act 1 bringing condominium apartments within the
FHA mortgage insurance program to provide an additional method
of financing multiple housing structures, 2 there has been growing
enthusiasm among lawyers, land developers, and members of the
real estate profession about the condominium concept of real property ownership. In a condominium an owner obtains a fee simple
title in severalty to a particular space within a structure together
with an undivided interest with other owners in the common areas,
walls, floors, ceilings, supports and other facilities of common usage.
The condominium unit is exclusively owned and possessed as an
estate in real property, separately assessed for tax purposes and
having all the characteristics ordinarily associated with other real
property estates. The word condominium is of Latin derivation and
is generally translated as "common ownership" or "joint dominion."
The FHA Model Statute for Creation of Apartment Ownership has
provided the general guide lines for state legislation passed during
the last two years. Oklahoma followed some thirty other states3
by passing a condominium statute in 1968. 4 Thus a word which
was practically unknown to attorneys and real estate people a few
months ago is fast becoming one which is frequently used in discussions among the members of these professions. The first condominium apartment in Oklahoma has just been completed5 and
there are indications that many more are in various stages of planning.
Although Section 2346 and the various state statutes have
obviously been directed toward multiple apartment unit ownership,
discussion and planning by practitioners seems to center upon
adapting the state statutes to the building and financing of such
structures as commercial buildings, shopping 7centers, office buildings, industrial centers and retirement villages.
1 Housing Act of 1961, § 104, 75 Stat. 160, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715y (West
Supp. 1962); FHA Regulations, 24 C.F.R. §§ 234.1-234.300 (1962).
2 FEDmaAL HousiNG ADmnINnATION, FAcr SHEET No. 491, FHA Mortgage Insurance on Condominiums (1962).
3
State legislatures which have passed enabling statutes or amendments
to existing statutes recognizing the condominium concept are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
4 60 OErA. STAT. §§ 501-530 (Supp. 1963).
5

Claimed by owners of Swissaire Apartments in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The
necessary declarations have been filed with the Clerk of Tulsa County and can
be found in Book 3406 at Page 554.
6 24 C.F.R. §§ 234.1-234.300.
7 FEnzmuA
HousiNG ADMnqismTiATioN, FACr SnEsr No. 491, op cit. supra
note 2.
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The Condominium Concept
Undoubtedly there will be many facets of the new statute to
be explored; many changes and modifications to be made; many
thoughts to be voiced and written on this subject. Questions are
being asked about all phases of condominium. Most of them involve
the legal characteristics and legal consequences. In this note no attempt is made to deal with the various applications and mechanics
of condominum. Discussion is confined to the examination and
evaluation of the concept, espoused by the condominium statutes,
of conveying "space" as real property.
The word condominium does not appear any place in the Oldahoma statute even though it is usually used in professional articles
and discussions. The statute refers instead to the concept as ownership of a unit estate.8 Such an estate is defined by the statute as an
enclosed space,9 which may be conveyed, encumbered, inherited,
devised or otherwise dealt with consistent with the laws of this
state. 10 Each unit owner is entitled to an undivided interest in certain common elements specified in the declaration.'1 Here then is
Oklahoma's first statutory authorization for the conveyance of a fee
simple title to "space."12 The divided estate conveyed under this
new concept is exactly that. The estate conveyed contains nothing
but air. The fee simple possessory right to the condominium unit is
to "airspace" and nothing more. The statute authorizes and requires
the simultaneous conveyance of the common elements. No partition
or division of the common elements from the "space" estate is permitted.13 If it were not for these associated undivided interests in
the common elements, it would be difficult to reconcile this "space
estate" concept with our accepted principles of real property law.
The FHA Model Statute and the state statutes carefully provide
for keeping the condominium "on the ground." The Oklahoma
statute requires that"the common elements shall not be separated
from the unit to which it appertains and shall be deemed conveyed
or encumbered with the unit even though such interest is not expressly mentioned or described in the conveyance or other instru-

74

s Oklahoma's statute is designated "Unit Ownership Estate Act." Other
states' statutes use "Horizontal Property Act" (Arkansas, Hawaii, Louisiana,
Virginia). Arizona's Act is called "Horizontal Property Regimes Law."
9 60 OrLA. STAT. § 503b (Supp. 1963).
1060 OiaA. STAT. § 504 (Supp. 1963).
1160 OxzA. STAT. § 505 (Supp. 1963).
12 Even though the state has recognized fee simple title to space, It is
still necessary for city and county ordinances to recognize a "cube of air' as a
separate and distinct lot" of real property. It must be permissible to record
separate deeds and mortgages for each unit. Ad valorem assessments must be
permitted on each unit separate from the assessment of the common elements.
Planning and zoning commissions must be willing and able to interpolate the
"air lots" in terms of subdivision plats, density regulations, parking space requirements, set back lines, multiple uses and major street plan arrangement.
'1S 60 Ox A. STAT. § 505 (Suipp.
1963).
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ment." This divided space estate is the intriguing element of this
new statutory concept of real property. The existence in law of such
a property right seems to bring into focus a legal problem that may
become increasingly disturbing as condominium litigation begins to
appear in our courts. The question may now well be asked-what
place will space occupy in the near future in, relation to our established and time honored law of real property?
In considering space as real property it is necessary to introduce
the third geometrical factor-height. Heretofore this dimension has
been of little significance in describing real property. Measurements
of width and length were sufficient. At the time of the early English
law, man's limited means of moving laterally on the earth made
travel slow and distances short. His ability to project himself, his
fixtures and chattels above the surface were even more restricted.
Consequently early English law was required to deal only with
property rights in two dimensions. The element of height could be
ignored. Yet, despite this fact and the relative simplicity of the early
real property cases, the jurists of the time still found it necessary
to place some significance upon the vertical character of real property. It Nwas usually enough to take "judicial notice" of the vertical
factor and pass on to other matters. This tacit acknowledgement
that real property is a three dimensional bit of space rather than
a plane area of earth was observed in the English law as early as
1628.15 The maxim expressed by Lord Coke: cuius est solum, ejus
est usque ad coelum et ad inferos,16 was the backbone of real property jurisprudence until near the end of the nineteenth century. The
law developed with a sort of judicial allegiance to the ad coelum
rule as a quaint concept which could be safely embraced when
equity and justice required it. In the early part of the twentieth
century, however, man's conquest of the air began to assert itself
with greater frequency and it became more and more difficult for
the courts to stretch the ad coelum doctrine. 17 In 1928 one legal
writer asserted:
" . . . there can be no logical escape from a recognition that
the jural concept of land can be described only by terms applicable to relative three-dimensional space . . . . There is no
logical reason why the law should not recognize space as distinct from the matter which occupies it. Whether space is or
14 Ibid.

15 Co. Lrrr. 4a.
16 2 BLAc soN , Com n
Arms 018. "To whomsoever the soil belongs,
he owns also to the sky and to the depths,' Br_.ci, LAw DIrnONAnY (4th ed.

1951).7

1 Note, Airspace: A New Dimension in Property Law, 1960 U. IrL.

L.F. 303, 306. Space has long been regarded as being of three dimensions
according to ordinary or Euclidean geometry but Einstein's theory adds a
fourth dimension. No doubt our twentieth century jurisprudence may place
this scientific factor in the same position as the early Roman and English

law placed the ad coelum maxim.
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is not objectively real, the law may conceive of it as existing." 18
The writer further reasoned that:
"A piece of land, as a thing in law, must be defined by ascripIt is believed that realition to three-dimensional space ....
zation of the nature of the concept of land will aid in the solution of some of the vexing problems which changes in our mode
of living have begun to bring into the courts." 9
Courts parried the myriad questions of air rights as man's flight
into space became more frequent and attained greater heights and
greater speed. Our case law is becoming more and more filled with
matters involving air easements, 20 airspace nuisances, 2 navigation
rights,22 trespass of airspace, 23 and even trespass by wireless transmissions through the space above the owners surface area.2 4 In
1960 one legal writer queried: "if the surface owner owns the space
to the extent that he can maintain a trespass action and demand
compensation for governmental taking, why shouldn't he be allowed to divide it up and convey it to another?"23 The answer
seems to resolve itself into two parts-first, can space as an abstract
estate be owned and conveyed to another; and second, is it necessary in law for such a space estate to be irrevocably joined to the
earth plane either in whole or in part?
The Oklahoma statutes follow the ad coelum theory in providing that the owner of land in fee has the right to the surface and
to everything permanently situated beneath and above it.2 6 Until
the enactment of the unit ownership estate act, however, the statutes
did not provide for the partition or separate conveyance in fee of
the space alone. Can space without the benefit of enclosure be
permanently located and described? Under the condominium statute
the unit space estate can be definitely described and located at a
fixed place in space by means of the solid substance of foundations,
walls, floors and ceilings. If this is possible under the law, then it
18 Ball, The Jural Nature of Land, 23 ILL. L. REv. 45, 62 (1928); but
see, 2 Tn-.,-, lREAL PRorERTY, § 583 (3d ed. 1939); "Whether the owner
of the land, in the ordinary case, actually owns the air space above the land,

and whether such air space is susceptible of division into strata for the purpose of separate ownership, is a question of difficulty." See also Pearson v.
Matheson, 102 S.C. 377, 86 S.E. 1063 (1915); Note, 29 Iornv. L. 11Ev. 525

(1916).
op. cit. supra note 18, at 67.
Reaver v. Martin Theatres, Inc., 52 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1951).

2'19Ball,
0

21

Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929 (N.D. Ohio 1930).
Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934).
23 Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, 1 N.J. Super. 346, 61 A.2d 645 (1948);
Smith24v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
Ball, op. cit. supra note 18, at 59.
25
Note, op. cit. supra note 17, at 310.
2660 03mA. STAT. § 64 (1961) (Real property ownership fee simple);
3 OxrLA. STAT. §§ 61-65.22 (1961) (Aircraft and Airports); 3 OKLA. STAT.
§§ 101-115 (Airport zoning); 3 OxLA. STAT. § 113 (1961) (Acquisition of
22

air rights, easements and interests).
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seems to follow that free unenclosed space could be severed and
separately conveyed in fee simple apart from the surface of the
earth. Whether space is a thing or the absence of things puts us
into the realm of imponderables but under the accepted Euclidean
definition of space 27 there can be nothing more permanent, thus

making it unnecessary to dwell upon the character of space itself.
It follows that if space is permanent, it can be described and permanently located with certainty. It seems unlikely that the Oklahoma real property statute28 contemplated the severance and separate conveyance of airspace estates, yet there seems to be no conflict between this statute and the new condominium act. Horizontal
and vertical enclosed spaces above the surface, attached to the earth
by the common elements of support, would lend itself to this construction. It is reasonable to suggest that as long as condominiums
remain in reasonable relationship with the ground, the Oklahoma
courts will favorably view space estates of real property. As to the
second part of the general question raised, is it really necessary to
find a place in our real property law for space estates not related
to the earth plane? It is submitted that having crossed the first
statutory span, it is almost a certainty that we must anticipate the
need for crossing the remaining legal span. There is a growing need
for concentrating commercial, industrial and residential activities
in certain areas for convenience, comfort and economy. Land values
in such concentrated areas are becoming so high in price that multistory structures and activities are an absolute necessity. Urban
sprawl is creating many problems and costly expenditures. Valuable
and irreplacable agricultural land is being taken out of production.
The "exploding population" of this twentieth century is forcing
the utilization of space in the air whether we like it or not. Our
jurisprudence must be prepared to keep abreast of these developments.29
The Res For Space
The idea of real property without land was given consideration
by one writer over thirty years ago.3 0 Even at that time it was ob2
7Eucidean Geometry assumes space has definite properties and magnitudes measurable in three dimensions.
2860 OKLA. STAT. § 64 (1961).
29 Note, op. cit. supra, note 17, at 313; "What impact new developments
in the field of anti-gravitational mechanics may have upon the utilization of
airspace is a question which must be left for the engineer. Suffice it to say
that revolutionary advances in architectural designs or transportation forms
could well multiply man's present abilities -to utilize airspace apart from simultaneous use of the subjacent surface. Thus, there would seem to be every
reason to believe that the practice of airspace subdivision will continue to
grow at a rapid pace throughout the nation. Clearly its future depends not
only upon the ingenuity of the engineer, but also upon the imagination and
skill 30
of the modem lawyer."
Ball, Division Into Horizontal Strata of the Landspace Above the
Surface, 39 YALE L.J. 616 (1930).
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served that this problem was not purely academic but rather anticipatory of problems which must some day be settled by the courts.
It was suggested that the superjacent landscape be divided by
horizontal planes into strata capable of several ownership. This
prophetic reasoning is now approaching reality in many condominium statutes. Perhaps the National Housing Act inadvertently
breathed new life into this almost forgotten concept and centered
new emphasis upon its need for analysis.
An examination of the problem of unattached space freeholds
requires an initial acceptance of the ad coelum rule. Unless there
is a basic assumption that the owner of the land fee has some
possessory right to the space above his land the problem becomes
an abstruse point of law. The controversial factors then turn upon
acceptance of one of several theories of interpretations of the ad
coelum maxim. Tiffany gives four different theories. The first and
generally accepted one is that the landowner's rights are limited
to that part of the space above his land of which he has effective
possession-that is, so much of the space as is essential to the complete use and enjoyment of the land.3 1 The second limits the landowner's rights to so much of the airspace above his land as he
actually uses, giving no consideration to possible future use. 2 The
third believes the landowner has no ownership or possessory rights
above his land. 3 The fourth is the theory expressed in most statutes
and text books and admits the landowners ownership of the airspace but grants to aircraft the right of navigation therein, subject
to certain restrictions.3 4
It is fairly obvious that the law of ownership of space above
the land and the vertical extent of such ownership, if any exists,
is still a matter of uncertainty.8 5 The landmark case of United States
v. Causby36 seems to subscribe to the first theory in stating that
"the landowner owns at least as much of the airspace above the
ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land, and
the fact that he does not occupy it in a physical sense by the erection of buildings is not material." On the other hand the ad coelum
doctrine has been denounced. In Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport,
the court said: "We think it is not the law, and that it never was
the law. This formula 'from the center of the earth to the sky' was
invented at some remote time in the past when the use of space
above the land actual or conceivable was confined to narrow limits,
and simply meant that the owner of the land could use the overlying
31
Swetland
32

v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929 (N.D. Ohio 1930).
Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936).
33
Maitland v. Twin City Aviation Corp., 254 Wise. 541, 37 N.W.2d
74 (1949).
34 Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, 1 N.J. Super. 340, 61 A.2d 645 (1948);
see generally Williams, The Existence of the Right of Flight, 79 U. PA. L. 1Ev,
729 (1931).
85
TrFrANY, REAL PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 18.

36328 U.S. 256, 66 Sup.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946).
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space to such an extent as he was able ....
,7 The court, sounded
a note of caution that ownership of space would lead to "space
speculation."38 Such a situation might be unfortunate but it would
certainly not be a new problem in the field of real property. There
is no denying that there will be complex and confusing issues, but
it seems to be important at this time for the law to find the proper
tools to make a substantive determination of all the aspects of space
estates and space rights. The res for space must be clearly defined.
Conclusion
It has been some seventy years since man has had the scientific
knowledge and mechanical and engineering ability to utilize space
at heights much over 100 feet. Perhaps the real significant change
came when the Wright brothers made their historic flight and removed the inexorable ties of gravity. It has been less than ten
years since man leaped from the Air age to the Space age. Today
we witness new and amazing feats of science transpiring with incredible regularity. Man's propensity to favorably adjust to scientific transition has been enlightening. It remains to be seen whether
jurisprudence can keep abreast of this quickly changing world. The
guide lines relied upon in real property jurisprudence should be
adequate to encompass the new space concept of fee ownership.
Courts should be prepared to make justiciable reformations to meet
the challenges, the most formidable of which may be the substantive determination of all aspects of space estates and space rights.
Writers have conceived of separately owned cubes of space and
cubical channels of space at various plane elevations completely
severed from the earth plane.89 Although science has not yet found
a way to neutralize gravitational forces for general application to
everyday use, it would seem reasonable that in this day of rocket
ships such an accomplishment is not far in the future. Legal answers
will no doubt be burdened with deeply emb edded feelings, dating
from early times, that all things must be a part of the earth. Perhaps
the initial portions of the space res are now being enunciated in the
modem condominium statutes.
Ben H. Crowley
8784 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936); see Allegheny Airlines v, Village of

Cedarhurst, 132 F.Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.
1956); Roosevelt Field v. Town of North Hempstead, 84 F.Supp. 456
(E.D.N.Y. 1949).
38 Id. at 758. The court stated: "It would be, and is, utterly impracticable
and would lead to endless confusion, if the law should 'uphold attempts of
land owners to stake out, or assert claims to definite, unused spaces in the
air in order to protect some contemplated future use of it. Such a rule, if
adopted, would constitute a departure never before attempted by mianind,
and utterly at variance with the reason of the law."
B9 Note, op. cit. supra note 17, at 310, argues the concept: " . . .IAZI
designated portion of airspace is no different than a lot, parcel, or acre of land,'
all of which are equally abstract dimensions in their primary and technical
sense as contradistinguished from their referential sense.'
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